Showing posts with label informative. Show all posts
Showing posts with label informative. Show all posts

Friday, May 1, 2015

The obvious solution and the remaining problem with it

Refocus the Priority of the NSA back onto National Security

  • We need a 100% disclosure rate for exploits discovered by the NSA. The NSA should report every single vulnerability it finds to the relevant software vendor within one month of discovering it. The funny thing about exploits is that smart people all over the world are working on finding them every day, and nobody seems to be substantially faster than anybody else. When one person discovers an exploit and reports it to a bug bounty program, 500 hackers sigh with disappointment because they were days or weeks from discovering the same one.

  • We need an end to mandatory backdoors into communications systems. Backdoors cannot be relied upon to remain hidden and only available to the law-enforcement or government personnel who are the intended users. Quite the contrary, backdoors render a cryptosystem worse-than-useless because they deliberately cultivate a false sense of security while simultaneously providing a predictable avenue of attack for malicious actors. Eventually, this should culminate in the drastic revision of ECPA and CFAA, and the repeal of CALEA.

  • We need to end mass surveillance because it's not helping us identify threats. As a technology, the hypothesis has failed and it's time to stop wasting money repeating the same mistakes.

  • We need to focus on combating cyber-espionage and cyber-warfare proactively, by fixing bugs before they can be exploited by malicious actors rather than hoarding exploits, which disproportionately leaves innocent computer users vulnerable. If cybersecurity is to be the purview of the US Government and the NSA, then the NSA must be re-imagined as a security research and bug reporting agency. In this way only can we perfect our computer systems and protect our people from cyber-espionage and cyber-warfare in the long term

Fix the Problems with The Chain of Evidence

  • We need something quite bizarre to fix this problem. We need to encourage a criminal escalation in cybercrime and cyber-related crime like online drug trafficking. The escalation we need is an SSL-Encrypted, peer-to-peer Log-Hash-Escrow system, which stores non-reversible hashes of security logs for sensitive sites. This is to assure that all hacking performed by law-enforcement agencies is accurately reported when it is entered into evidence in a court of law. This will also help limit frivolous and excessive inaccuracies of lawsuits on the part of copyright lobbying agencies that stifle innovation like the RIAA and MPAA.

  • This is another difficult decision, like Tor itself was, but it is one of the only credible ways of restoring credibility to American cybercrime investigators.

The obvious solution and the remaining problem with it

Thursday, April 30, 2015

One last thing, let's talk about Parallel Construction

From the standpoint of due process, perhaps the most unsettling aspect of NSA activity so far is how it's bad processes have spread like a virus, corrupting agencies that have potentially much more positive and useful missions like the FBI. "Parallel Construction" is a practice recommended by the NSA to investigative agencies like the FBI and investigative arms of administrative agencies like the IRS, which entails the use of illegal evidence to discover suspects and directs investigators to fabricate a legal chain of evidence in order to obtain a legal conviction on U.S. soil in a U.S. court of law.

I was recently contacted by a young person who wanted me to help him breach a Facebook account belonging to his mother, believing that she was about to remarry her current boyfriend. The young man believed he would be able to discern his mother's suitor by stealing her private messages. I told him exactly what I tell everyone who asks me to violate someone's privacy, which is no, but I also told him something that I hadn't told anyone before.

"If I were to violate your mother's privacy and steal her messages so you could confront her with the identity of her suitor, she would certainly suspect that the information was obtained by surreptitiously intercepting her messages. That means that you have done wrong, while she has simply chosen to remarry, which is her right and privelege. Doing this is a violation of her trust on your part, which damages your position before you even get a chance to make it. It is better to be honest."

Activities like Parallel Construction undermine the confidence that law-abiding, honest Americans have in the ability of law enforcement, which is compounded by the problem which makes it possible, that any evidence collected in the course of a computer crime investigation comes under the control of an agency that has a vested interest in conceal any practice of Parallel construction. In short, confidence in the very notion of a chain of evidence for cybercrime is rightly shattered and requires an engineering solution.

One last thing, let's talk about Parallel Construction

Tuesday, April 28, 2015

Let's start with blanket surveillance, can compromising privacy en masse save lives?

Balancing selection and privacy

How about programs that provide proactive intelligence based on so-called "Selectors?" Do they save enough lives to justify the invasiveness and expensiveness of mass archival of personal, potentially sensitive information?

The NSA currently claims that it's intelligence has prevented 55 terrorist events or cyberattacks this year. This is not likely to be true. As a matter of fact it's much more likely that this figure was made up on the spot. Statistically, the likelihood that 55 terrorist attacks on Americans were planned this year is almost inconcievable. I cannot find a calculator capable of turning that into a Z-score. We're like more than 30 standard deviations above the mean here. It's that unlikely. Bottom line, either the NSA has perjured itself or in the years since the US started the War on Terror the likelihood of a terrorist attack on Americans has exploded at a unprecedentedly catastrophic rate. Either way, that is a Really Big Problem.

But let's take them at their word for a moment and assume that they have actually prevented 55 terrorist attacks. The NSA spends about $10 billion per year, roughly 14% of the total national budget. $10 billion divided by 55 is an average cost of $181818181.81 per attack. Almost 200 million dollars per attack. It is not callous to call for this process to be more efficient.

Another potential analysis of the costs and benefits of this information is the problematic factors of putting such tempting information at the fingertips of fallible human agents. The widespread sharing of private love letters, especially those containing nude photos intended for personal messages between lovers, has occurred many many more than 55 times, although the actual figure is as yet indeterminate. Instances of stalking are also common among NSA employees, civilian contractors, and police all over the world, including in the US.

And let's not forget, if the NSA can get it, so can anyone else.

Let's start with blanket surveillance, can compromising privacy en masse save lives?

Monday, April 27, 2015

But does it do any good? Can it do any good?

So we know that if the NSA can get it, anyone can get it, but if the NSA can do it's job efficiently enough to prevent loss of life or destruction of property does the end justify the means, if only in terms of cost-benefit analysis? In order to examine this we need to break internet surveillance into several categories.

First, a distinction needs to be made between Privacy and Anonymity.

Privacy in this context pertains to the contents of messages sent between users on the internet.

Anonymity pertains to the identifiable characteristics pertaining to the sender and recipient of a message.

Next, a distinction needs to be made between two types of surveillance.

Selection is defined as the process of distinguishing the majority of collected internet traffic from a potential risk. This is the "Needle in the haystack" analogy.

Targeted is defined as the use of exploits to compromise targets in order to gather evidence or determine the identity of a suspect.

But does it do any good? Can it do any good?

Saturday, April 25, 2015

So what is the point?

The point is that if the NSA can get it, anybody can get it. Accomodating NSA spying, far from being a way of preventing attacks on critical infrastructure, actually preserves dangerous attack vectors for criminal use. If the NSA discovers an exploit and does not report it to the developers of the vulnerable application, that application remains vulnerable for everyone who uses it, the vast majority of whom will by definition be non-criminal actors within the developed world. People with jobs, paying taxes that are, also by definition, making them less safe.

Exploit hoarding disproportionately harms Americans. Whatever else happens, the NSA's exploit hoarding programs, including but not limited to BULLRUN, must be stopped.

So what is the point?

Friday, April 24, 2015

And oh, by the way, here's why backdoors are a bad idea

Some editions of Microsoft Windows include a full-disk encryption scheme called BitLocker. In order to enable a Windows user to recover the encryption key required to unlock their hard drive if they lose it, that key is kept in escrow by Microsoft on their Azure cloud platform. there are obviously good reasons to do something like this. In order for an attacker to retrieve a copy of that key, he can browse a user's social network profiles to troll for information which he can use to impersonate the target to Microsoft support. They call Microsoft, use the information to impersonate the target, Microsoft will send them the key. It's that simple. A glorified crank call. It is known that the NSA can access information on the Azure cloud both surreptitiously and by court order.

There is an easy way to avoid this. Don't escrow keys in systems which can be viewed by the person administering the server. Instead, use double-blind ways of storing the data, which leave the only usable, unencrypted copy of the key with the account holder and never hold an unencrypted key on the server. This has been implemented in Tahoe-LAFS and is now being implemented in many consumer grade clouds(Yay!). This is called Zero-Knowledge encryption.

This is essentially a password-reset vulnerability used to privelege-escalate into an encrypted storage device. A similar password-reset vulnerability exists on Facebook, Amazon.com, Linkedin, Netflix, World-of-Warcraft, a ton of other sites and in all Two-Factor Authentication schemes that rely on text-messaging a transient key to an account holder.

Additionally, the recent iCloud breaches somewhat ignominously dubbed "The Fappening" utilized a well-known backdoor used by law-enforcement agents in the U.S.

And oh, by the way, here's why backdoors are a bad idea

Saturday, April 18, 2015

BadUSB is a vulnerability which relies on the fact that USB devices carry firmware which must be loaded by your OS in order for it to be used, even though it is straightforward to load a malicious firmware onto most USB devices. Relatively difficult to defend against using conventional methods, some defenses exist that can be quite effective if you are diligent, even though for now all standard USB devices are vulnerable.

BadUSB Reading List

SRLabs BadUSB Category

BadUSB Info Page

SRLabs BadUSB Research(PDF)

On Accessories that Turn Evil

Wired Article(Sensationalism, but understanding sensationalism is important too)

Why USB is Fundamentally Broken

PCWorld Article(Less informative, but less sensationalist)

What can you do about BadUSB

NakedSecurity suggests different USB Hardware workflow

DIY-BadUSB

Reddit Thread

/r/netsec

BadUSB Video List

On Accessories that turn Evil

Simple explanation of BadUSB

Making BadUSB Work for You

BadUSB How-To

BadUSB Hardware implant with Kali Nethunter

BadUSB Github Repositories

USB Blacklisting/Whitelisting Option: USB WatchDog

USB Watchdog

Another promising USB Blacklisting/Whitelisting Option: USB Guard

USB Guard

Psychson Firmware and Loader(BadUSB Do-It-Yourself)

Psychson

Psychsolin Linux port of PsychSon

Psychsolin

BadUSB Reading and Video List

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

<p>I've always liked this video as an explanation of what makes the UNIX
architecture so cool and useful. Pay especial attention about 5 minutes in,
when he writes a surprisingly capable spell checker in one line of shell script.</p>

What's so great about UNIX?

 
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